IBB Reveals how Murtala Muhammed became the head of state and how he told Obasanjo and Danjuma that they would not be beholden to anyone as head of state, as well as the story about the day of his assassination in his Book
IBB, in his book, also revealed that the early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before.
He wrote: “One of the accusations against General Gowon (which, in retrospect, seemed unfair) was that he ran the business of governance ‘like a one-man show’! So, we, the ‘younger’ senior officers who had played a role in the coup, decided that the new post-Gowon government’s leadership must be overtly collective. So, while we concluded that Brigadier Murtala Muhammed should be the head of state, our preference was for him to operate only as first among equals, especially in his dealings with the two other prominent senior officers, Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo and Theophilus Danjuma. But we knew Muhammed enough to know he would need to be persuaded to accept such an arrangement.à
“So, while the rest of us ‘younger’ senior officers waited in an adjacent room, Colonel Wushishi, Lieutenant-Colonels Joe Garba, Abdullahi Mohammed and Yar’Adua took Brigadiers Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma to another room to negotiate the terms of our proposal for a triumvirate-type leadership where Muhammed will be required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma. I couldn’t describe the mood since we were absent from that meeting. But we were close enough to pick up Muhammed’s thundering voice, rejecting such proposals outrightly. As far as I remember, the meeting lasted for hours past midnight. Finally, Murtala Muhammed agreed to be head of state while insisting that he would not be beholden to anyone as head of state!
In a prompt style that typified his leadership, he quickly announced several retirements the next day, just as he made new appointments. All officers above the rank of Major-General or senior to any new government member were compulsorily retired. Those retired included such persons as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Vice-Admiral Joseph Wey; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Hassan Katsina; the Chief of Staff (Army), Major-General David Ejoor; the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh; the Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue; the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Salem; the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, T. A. Fagbola and Major-General Adeyinka Adebayo.
“These retirements were followed simultaneously with new appointments. While the Commissioner for Works and Housing from the old SMC, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, replaced Vice- Admiral Wey as the new Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma replaced Major-General Ejoor as the Chief of Staff (Army). Danjuma would change the designation of that position upon resumption of office to ‘Chief of Army Staff,’ which has remained the designation ever since. The only surviving senior army officer from Gowon’s SMC, Brigadier Iliya Bisalla, also the NDA’s Commandant, became Minister of Defence. Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Yusuf became the Inspector-General of Police. Colonel John Yisa-Doko took over from Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue as Chief of Air Staff, while Commodore Michael Adelanwa replaced Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh as Chief of Naval Staff.
“The early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before. After the twelve military governors from the Gowon era were compulsorily retired, the government ordered a probe of their conduct in office.
“Ten of the twelve governors were found guilty of illegal enrichment and ‘dismissed with ignominy.’ Brigadiers Oluwole Rotimi and Mobolaji Johnson were the only two not found to have enriched themselves illegally.
“Some civilian members of the Gowon cabinet were also found to have enriched themselves illegally. Apart from Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Finance Commissioner and Alhaji Ali Monguno, who was in charge of Mines and Power, the government found all others guilty of improper enrichment and were made to forfeit illegally acquired assets. Similarly, in a broad wave of retirements that affected thousands of civil servants, many top civil servants were also caught in the web of asset forfeiture of ill-gotten assets. Even the revered Federal Public Service Commission Chairman, Alhaji Sule Katagum, was not spared. He was also dismissed.
“Looking back now and writing as a member of the SMC, I realise we probably overdid the retirement exercise. The idea of retiring corrupt and incompetent public officers was appropriate. But because we failed to provide a platform for challenging retirements in the surge of events, some civil servants may have been victims of an unfair witch-hunt. Goaded on by a seemingly over-exuberant mass media, we didn’t look deeply at the implications of the mass purge, mainly as it affected the civil service. I am not sure our federal civil service fully recovered from that purge.
The General Murtala Assassination.
“FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1976, started like any typical day for me. I lived at No 19 Crescent, Ikoyi, Lagos, although my troops were stationed at the cantonment in Ikeja. However, because the Committee on Army Reorganisation, which I headed, was furiously at work during that period, I reported first in the morning at Defence Headquarters, which was close by, before heading out to Ikeja.
“My regular route to army headquarters was through the faster Osborne Road. But for some reason, on this fateful morning, as my driver opted at about 8.45 a.m. to turn right through our regular route, I instinctively told him to turn left and go through the more open Kingsway Road to avoid possible traffic congestion. That decision may have saved my life because, unknown to me, Major Ibrahim Rabo’s men, led by Lieutenant Peter Cigari, had been detailed to ambush and kill me on the Osborne Road route. At that time, I was oblivious to the fact that the so-called Dimka coup, which led to the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed, his ADC, Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa and his driver, Sergeant Adamu Michika, had been operational for over an hour. Muhammed’s orderly, who was also in the car, Staff Sergeant Michael Otuwe, narrowly survived the onslaught.
“The plotters’ strategy was to lay several ambushes for different government members along their routes to work that morning. As emerged from subsequent investigations, Major Ibrahim Rabo, Captain Malaki Parwang and Lieutenant William Seri, led by Lt-Col. Bukar Suka Dimka, laid in wait for Muhammed’s entourage. In a well-coordinated plan, Dimka assigned each assassin specific roles and functions. In aiming his shots at Muhammed, Lieutenant Seri was said to be so ruthless that he emptied more than one magazine of ammunition into the car carrying the head of state.
“The scene was in disarray when I arrived at the army headquarters, still oblivious to what had happened. But I soon found out that a coup attempt was ongoing and that it needed to be put down. I’ll never forget my exchange with General Akinrinade as I sauntered into the top floor of the building: ‘Ibrahim, where the hell have you been?’ the General inquired. ‘We’ve been looking for you. You must go and see T. Y. (Danjuma) immediately,’ he continued.
“Convinced I was being sought after because of our ongoing meeting on the army’s reorganisation, I looked at my wristwatch and told the General I was on time since it wasn’t yet 9 a.m.! ‘Who’s talking of a meeting?’ the General thundered back. ‘Haven’t you heard what happened, that the head of state has just been assassinated and that Major Dimka has made a broadcast claiming to have taken over?’
“I remember exactly how I felt that morning when General Akinrinade broke the news to me. I was utterly shattered and devastated. And I remember muttering to myself as I walked towards General Danjuma’s office: ‘Dimka, organising a coup? That’s not a serious character. How could he contemplate such a thing? Dimka? That’s impossible.’
“When I met with Danjuma, his instructions were unambiguous: ‘Ibrahim, go to the Radio House and flush Dimka out of that place immediately.’ The first thing I did was to get in touch with my troops stationed at the Ikeja cantonment. But I also knew I had to be careful with so much uncertainty in the air since I wasn’t sure where they stood regarding their loyalty. After I failed to establish contact with any of my most trusted lieutenants by telephone, I quickly hopped on a motorcycle ridden by a young corporal, whose name I forget now. On our way to Ikeja, I stopped at Lt-Col. Hamzat Abdullahi’s residence at Ilupeju, close to the Ikeja cantonment. Once I confirmed that it was safe to enter the cantonment, I borrowed Hamzat’s car and entered the premises through a rear entrance. Once inside the cantonment, I established contact with Lt-Col. Chris Ugokwe. With the assistance of Lt-Cols. Ugokwe and Joshua Dogonyaro, I mobilised loyal troops, weapons and vehicles before heading back to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) Radio House at Ikoyi.
“When we got to Radio House in an armoured column, we noticed that Dimka’s men surrounded the place, primarily young officers who were a part of the plot, including his ADC, 2nd Lt Samuel Garba. As I got down from my armoured vehicle, unarmed, and approached the building, Dimka’s ADC, Garba, attempted to stop me. By now, Dimka had spotted me from the storey building and screamed: ‘Ibrahim, I’m going to shoot you’! I shouted back: ‘Well, that’s okay. If you shoot me, you know my family. You’ll take care of them. They’ll become your responsibility. I have no problem. It would be nice to die in the hands of a friend.’ After a pause, Dimka soberly replied: ‘Ibrahim, I like your guts. Come upstairs.’
“As I gingerly took my steps up the stairs, a visibly fretful Ugokwe pleaded with me to be very careful. I waved Chris away, reminding him that ‘Bukar’ (his middle name, by which close friends called Dimka) and I had come a long way. Besides, being a trained officer, I was confident that Dimka would not shoot an unarmed colleague.
“And Dimka was indeed a close friend, one of the groomsmen at my wedding to Maryam in Kaduna in 1969. A 1963 Australian Army Officer Cadet School graduate in Portsea, Australia, Dimka was one of the first Nigerian army officers to be trained in faraway Australia. Although he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Physical Training Corps of the Army, he lived on the edge and earned himself a crappy reputation for womanising and heavy drinking.
When I got upstairs, I could tell from his breath that he had had a lot to drink.
“The stench of alcohol from around him and his boys was pungent. Chris Ugokwe was right, after all! I needed to be careful because the atmosphere was so charged that any wrong move could lead to the loss of lives. To keep Dimka at ease, I opened the conversation. ‘Bukar, why didn’t you tell me you were planning this? Com’on, you and I are supposed to be close.’
‘No, we couldn’t trust you. We didn’t know where you belonged. But I hope you know that you are one of the most unpopular officers in the Nigerian army today.’ he blurted out, his glaring bloodshot eyes betraying evidence of tiredness and confusion.
“He continued this time with a self-applauding, misplaced cockiness: ‘Ibrahim, you’re lucky to be alive because you were one of those pencilled down to be killed, but I was against it. And if I wanted to do it, I would have done it when you walked in now!’‘Why me?’ I asked him.
‘Because people felt that officers like Danjuma favoured you and liked you more than other officers,’ he replied. How could YOU be a member of the Supreme Military Council? he queried.
“Then, suddenly, his ADC, 2nd Lt Garba, also visibly drunk, nervously showed up and suggested that Dimka take me hostage and use me as a bargaining chip with the government. Dimka angrily screamed at Garba and chased him out. Once Garba scampered out, Dimka and I settled for a ‘frank’ discussion. In doing so, I reminded him of the need to keep things under control to avoid flaring tempers in the circumstances we had all found ourselves in.
First, he wanted to know if I had come to trick him into some form of surrender, akin to what happened to Chukwuma Nzeogwu during the January 1966 coup when Lt-Col. Conrad Nwawo came to Kaduna to persuade Nzeogwu to give himself up in return for some form of amnesty. When I convinced him that that was not my mission, he calmed down and listened. I asked him what he wanted, and he said he wanted a change of government. He even attempted to persuade me to join them in their attempt!
“But even as he made that intolerable request of me, it was apparent from his body language that he knew the game was up. Then, his tone started to change. Could I guarantee his safety? Could I negotiate a written amnesty for him and all his co-plotters? Again, as I had done earlier, I pleaded with him to give himself up and avoid any form of conflagration that could damage the Radio House and lead to the death of civilians and soldiers. That chit-chat went on for quite some time, and when I appeared not to be making headway with him, I left with a promise to return later.
“Only after I left Dimka did I get a better glimpse of what had happened in the past few hours. Apart from General Muhammed, who had earlier been murdered, a group of mutineers, in a case of mistaken identity, opened fire on the car carrying Colonel Reis Dumuje on Awolowo Road, believing that Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo was in the vehicle. Fortunately, Dumuje survived. In Kwara State, the Military Governor, Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, was abducted outside Offa by Lieutenant Zagni and some NCOs and murdered.
“In Ibadan, another group of mutineers led by Major Gagara went on a rampage and invaded the 26th Infantry Battalion and the WNBS/WNTV Broadcast House in Agodi. However, they could not capture the Military Governor of Oyo State, Colonel David Jemibewon, who was also to have been killed. And, as subsequent investigations showed, the mutineers laid other ambushes for General Danjuma and other senior members of the administration. I was pained to discover that not only were my close friends, such as Colonel Wya, Lt-Col. Tense, Major Ola Ogunmekan, Major Joe Kasai, and Major Alfa Aliyu, knee-deep in the plot, one of them that was closest to me, Major Clement Dabang, would be the one to suggest that I be killed.
“Meanwhile, I returned to General Danjuma to give him a report of my encounter with Dimka. Danjuma was furious. He ordered me back to the Radio House with a reiteration of his earlier instructions to ‘flush Dimka out of place immediately.’ I returned to Radio House with Chris Ugokwe, better equipped and prepared. By now, we had been joined by, among others, Mike Otuwa, James Ojokojo, John Shagaya and Jack Iketubosin. But first, I had to reach out to my friend and classmate, Sani Sami, who commanded the Brigade of Guards, to handle a difficult assignment. The Brigade of Guards’ barracks provided easy access to the Radio House. But again, I had to be careful since I wasn’t sure whether the Brigade was still loyal to the government.
“Sani Sami and I consulted and agreed that there should be minimum destruction. And that we would do what we were taught as cadets in situations involving a civilian population to ensure that civilians got out of the way and didn’t get injured. Once that was done, we moved in, cordoned off the area and engaged the mutineers in a gun battle. There were casualties in the ensuing armed confrontation, including Dimka’s ADC, 2nd Lt Garba. Also, one of the other vital plotters, Major Ibrahim Rabo, was arrested by Major Yomi Williams as he tried to escape and was promptly taken to the Bonny camp for interrogation. But, somehow, Dimka, quite inexplicably to this day, managed to escape from the scene unharmed.
“Later that evening, the Federal government announced that the coup attempt had been quashed and declared seven days of national mourning in Murtala’s honour. The next day, February 14, General Muhammed was buried in Kano at a ceremony witnessed by thousands of mourners and members of the SMC, including Major- General Bisalla, who would later be implicated in the coup attempt.”
IBB, in his book, also revealed that the early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before.
He wrote: “One of the accusations against General Gowon (which, in retrospect, seemed unfair) was that he ran the business of governance ‘like a one-man show’! So, we, the ‘younger’ senior officers who had played a role in the coup, decided that the new post-Gowon government’s leadership must be overtly collective. So, while we concluded that Brigadier Murtala Muhammed should be the head of state, our preference was for him to operate only as first among equals, especially in his dealings with the two other prominent senior officers, Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo and Theophilus Danjuma. But we knew Muhammed enough to know he would need to be persuaded to accept such an arrangement.à
“So, while the rest of us ‘younger’ senior officers waited in an adjacent room, Colonel Wushishi, Lieutenant-Colonels Joe Garba, Abdullahi Mohammed and Yar’Adua took Brigadiers Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma to another room to negotiate the terms of our proposal for a triumvirate-type leadership where Muhammed will be required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma. I couldn’t describe the mood since we were absent from that meeting. But we were close enough to pick up Muhammed’s thundering voice, rejecting such proposals outrightly. As far as I remember, the meeting lasted for hours past midnight. Finally, Murtala Muhammed agreed to be head of state while insisting that he would not be beholden to anyone as head of state!
In a prompt style that typified his leadership, he quickly announced several retirements the next day, just as he made new appointments. All officers above the rank of Major-General or senior to any new government member were compulsorily retired. Those retired included such persons as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Vice-Admiral Joseph Wey; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Hassan Katsina; the Chief of Staff (Army), Major-General David Ejoor; the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh; the Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue; the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Salem; the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, T. A. Fagbola and Major-General Adeyinka Adebayo.
“These retirements were followed simultaneously with new appointments. While the Commissioner for Works and Housing from the old SMC, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, replaced Vice- Admiral Wey as the new Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma replaced Major-General Ejoor as the Chief of Staff (Army). Danjuma would change the designation of that position upon resumption of office to ‘Chief of Army Staff,’ which has remained the designation ever since. The only surviving senior army officer from Gowon’s SMC, Brigadier Iliya Bisalla, also the NDA’s Commandant, became Minister of Defence. Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Yusuf became the Inspector-General of Police. Colonel John Yisa-Doko took over from Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue as Chief of Air Staff, while Commodore Michael Adelanwa replaced Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh as Chief of Naval Staff.
“The early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before. After the twelve military governors from the Gowon era were compulsorily retired, the government ordered a probe of their conduct in office.
“Ten of the twelve governors were found guilty of illegal enrichment and ‘dismissed with ignominy.’ Brigadiers Oluwole Rotimi and Mobolaji Johnson were the only two not found to have enriched themselves illegally.
“Some civilian members of the Gowon cabinet were also found to have enriched themselves illegally. Apart from Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Finance Commissioner and Alhaji Ali Monguno, who was in charge of Mines and Power, the government found all others guilty of improper enrichment and were made to forfeit illegally acquired assets. Similarly, in a broad wave of retirements that affected thousands of civil servants, many top civil servants were also caught in the web of asset forfeiture of ill-gotten assets. Even the revered Federal Public Service Commission Chairman, Alhaji Sule Katagum, was not spared. He was also dismissed.
“Looking back now and writing as a member of the SMC, I realise we probably overdid the retirement exercise. The idea of retiring corrupt and incompetent public officers was appropriate. But because we failed to provide a platform for challenging retirements in the surge of events, some civil servants may have been victims of an unfair witch-hunt. Goaded on by a seemingly over-exuberant mass media, we didn’t look deeply at the implications of the mass purge, mainly as it affected the civil service. I am not sure our federal civil service fully recovered from that purge.
The General Murtala Assassination.
“FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1976, started like any typical day for me. I lived at No 19 Crescent, Ikoyi, Lagos, although my troops were stationed at the cantonment in Ikeja. However, because the Committee on Army Reorganisation, which I headed, was furiously at work during that period, I reported first in the morning at Defence Headquarters, which was close by, before heading out to Ikeja.
“My regular route to army headquarters was through the faster Osborne Road. But for some reason, on this fateful morning, as my driver opted at about 8.45 a.m. to turn right through our regular route, I instinctively told him to turn left and go through the more open Kingsway Road to avoid possible traffic congestion. That decision may have saved my life because, unknown to me, Major Ibrahim Rabo’s men, led by Lieutenant Peter Cigari, had been detailed to ambush and kill me on the Osborne Road route. At that time, I was oblivious to the fact that the so-called Dimka coup, which led to the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed, his ADC, Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa and his driver, Sergeant Adamu Michika, had been operational for over an hour. Muhammed’s orderly, who was also in the car, Staff Sergeant Michael Otuwe, narrowly survived the onslaught.
“The plotters’ strategy was to lay several ambushes for different government members along their routes to work that morning. As emerged from subsequent investigations, Major Ibrahim Rabo, Captain Malaki Parwang and Lieutenant William Seri, led by Lt-Col. Bukar Suka Dimka, laid in wait for Muhammed’s entourage. In a well-coordinated plan, Dimka assigned each assassin specific roles and functions. In aiming his shots at Muhammed, Lieutenant Seri was said to be so ruthless that he emptied more than one magazine of ammunition into the car carrying the head of state.
“The scene was in disarray when I arrived at the army headquarters, still oblivious to what had happened. But I soon found out that a coup attempt was ongoing and that it needed to be put down. I’ll never forget my exchange with General Akinrinade as I sauntered into the top floor of the building: ‘Ibrahim, where the hell have you been?’ the General inquired. ‘We’ve been looking for you. You must go and see T. Y. (Danjuma) immediately,’ he continued.
“Convinced I was being sought after because of our ongoing meeting on the army’s reorganisation, I looked at my wristwatch and told the General I was on time since it wasn’t yet 9 a.m.! ‘Who’s talking of a meeting?’ the General thundered back. ‘Haven’t you heard what happened, that the head of state has just been assassinated and that Major Dimka has made a broadcast claiming to have taken over?’
“I remember exactly how I felt that morning when General Akinrinade broke the news to me. I was utterly shattered and devastated. And I remember muttering to myself as I walked towards General Danjuma’s office: ‘Dimka, organising a coup? That’s not a serious character. How could he contemplate such a thing? Dimka? That’s impossible.’
“When I met with Danjuma, his instructions were unambiguous: ‘Ibrahim, go to the Radio House and flush Dimka out of that place immediately.’ The first thing I did was to get in touch with my troops stationed at the Ikeja cantonment. But I also knew I had to be careful with so much uncertainty in the air since I wasn’t sure where they stood regarding their loyalty. After I failed to establish contact with any of my most trusted lieutenants by telephone, I quickly hopped on a motorcycle ridden by a young corporal, whose name I forget now. On our way to Ikeja, I stopped at Lt-Col. Hamzat Abdullahi’s residence at Ilupeju, close to the Ikeja cantonment. Once I confirmed that it was safe to enter the cantonment, I borrowed Hamzat’s car and entered the premises through a rear entrance. Once inside the cantonment, I established contact with Lt-Col. Chris Ugokwe. With the assistance of Lt-Cols. Ugokwe and Joshua Dogonyaro, I mobilised loyal troops, weapons and vehicles before heading back to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) Radio House at Ikoyi.
“When we got to Radio House in an armoured column, we noticed that Dimka’s men surrounded the place, primarily young officers who were a part of the plot, including his ADC, 2nd Lt Samuel Garba. As I got down from my armoured vehicle, unarmed, and approached the building, Dimka’s ADC, Garba, attempted to stop me. By now, Dimka had spotted me from the storey building and screamed: ‘Ibrahim, I’m going to shoot you’! I shouted back: ‘Well, that’s okay. If you shoot me, you know my family. You’ll take care of them. They’ll become your responsibility. I have no problem. It would be nice to die in the hands of a friend.’ After a pause, Dimka soberly replied: ‘Ibrahim, I like your guts. Come upstairs.’
“As I gingerly took my steps up the stairs, a visibly fretful Ugokwe pleaded with me to be very careful. I waved Chris away, reminding him that ‘Bukar’ (his middle name, by which close friends called Dimka) and I had come a long way. Besides, being a trained officer, I was confident that Dimka would not shoot an unarmed colleague.
“And Dimka was indeed a close friend, one of the groomsmen at my wedding to Maryam in Kaduna in 1969. A 1963 Australian Army Officer Cadet School graduate in Portsea, Australia, Dimka was one of the first Nigerian army officers to be trained in faraway Australia. Although he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Physical Training Corps of the Army, he lived on the edge and earned himself a crappy reputation for womanising and heavy drinking.
When I got upstairs, I could tell from his breath that he had had a lot to drink.
“The stench of alcohol from around him and his boys was pungent. Chris Ugokwe was right, after all! I needed to be careful because the atmosphere was so charged that any wrong move could lead to the loss of lives. To keep Dimka at ease, I opened the conversation. ‘Bukar, why didn’t you tell me you were planning this? Com’on, you and I are supposed to be close.’
‘No, we couldn’t trust you. We didn’t know where you belonged. But I hope you know that you are one of the most unpopular officers in the Nigerian army today.’ he blurted out, his glaring bloodshot eyes betraying evidence of tiredness and confusion.
“He continued this time with a self-applauding, misplaced cockiness: ‘Ibrahim, you’re lucky to be alive because you were one of those pencilled down to be killed, but I was against it. And if I wanted to do it, I would have done it when you walked in now!’‘Why me?’ I asked him.
‘Because people felt that officers like Danjuma favoured you and liked you more than other officers,’ he replied. How could YOU be a member of the Supreme Military Council? he queried.
“Then, suddenly, his ADC, 2nd Lt Garba, also visibly drunk, nervously showed up and suggested that Dimka take me hostage and use me as a bargaining chip with the government. Dimka angrily screamed at Garba and chased him out. Once Garba scampered out, Dimka and I settled for a ‘frank’ discussion. In doing so, I reminded him of the need to keep things under control to avoid flaring tempers in the circumstances we had all found ourselves in.
First, he wanted to know if I had come to trick him into some form of surrender, akin to what happened to Chukwuma Nzeogwu during the January 1966 coup when Lt-Col. Conrad Nwawo came to Kaduna to persuade Nzeogwu to give himself up in return for some form of amnesty. When I convinced him that that was not my mission, he calmed down and listened. I asked him what he wanted, and he said he wanted a change of government. He even attempted to persuade me to join them in their attempt!
“But even as he made that intolerable request of me, it was apparent from his body language that he knew the game was up. Then, his tone started to change. Could I guarantee his safety? Could I negotiate a written amnesty for him and all his co-plotters? Again, as I had done earlier, I pleaded with him to give himself up and avoid any form of conflagration that could damage the Radio House and lead to the death of civilians and soldiers. That chit-chat went on for quite some time, and when I appeared not to be making headway with him, I left with a promise to return later.
“Only after I left Dimka did I get a better glimpse of what had happened in the past few hours. Apart from General Muhammed, who had earlier been murdered, a group of mutineers, in a case of mistaken identity, opened fire on the car carrying Colonel Reis Dumuje on Awolowo Road, believing that Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo was in the vehicle. Fortunately, Dumuje survived. In Kwara State, the Military Governor, Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, was abducted outside Offa by Lieutenant Zagni and some NCOs and murdered.
“In Ibadan, another group of mutineers led by Major Gagara went on a rampage and invaded the 26th Infantry Battalion and the WNBS/WNTV Broadcast House in Agodi. However, they could not capture the Military Governor of Oyo State, Colonel David Jemibewon, who was also to have been killed. And, as subsequent investigations showed, the mutineers laid other ambushes for General Danjuma and other senior members of the administration. I was pained to discover that not only were my close friends, such as Colonel Wya, Lt-Col. Tense, Major Ola Ogunmekan, Major Joe Kasai, and Major Alfa Aliyu, knee-deep in the plot, one of them that was closest to me, Major Clement Dabang, would be the one to suggest that I be killed.
“Meanwhile, I returned to General Danjuma to give him a report of my encounter with Dimka. Danjuma was furious. He ordered me back to the Radio House with a reiteration of his earlier instructions to ‘flush Dimka out of place immediately.’ I returned to Radio House with Chris Ugokwe, better equipped and prepared. By now, we had been joined by, among others, Mike Otuwa, James Ojokojo, John Shagaya and Jack Iketubosin. But first, I had to reach out to my friend and classmate, Sani Sami, who commanded the Brigade of Guards, to handle a difficult assignment. The Brigade of Guards’ barracks provided easy access to the Radio House. But again, I had to be careful since I wasn’t sure whether the Brigade was still loyal to the government.
“Sani Sami and I consulted and agreed that there should be minimum destruction. And that we would do what we were taught as cadets in situations involving a civilian population to ensure that civilians got out of the way and didn’t get injured. Once that was done, we moved in, cordoned off the area and engaged the mutineers in a gun battle. There were casualties in the ensuing armed confrontation, including Dimka’s ADC, 2nd Lt Garba. Also, one of the other vital plotters, Major Ibrahim Rabo, was arrested by Major Yomi Williams as he tried to escape and was promptly taken to the Bonny camp for interrogation. But, somehow, Dimka, quite inexplicably to this day, managed to escape from the scene unharmed.
“Later that evening, the Federal government announced that the coup attempt had been quashed and declared seven days of national mourning in Murtala’s honour. The next day, February 14, General Muhammed was buried in Kano at a ceremony witnessed by thousands of mourners and members of the SMC, including Major- General Bisalla, who would later be implicated in the coup attempt.”
🇳🇬IBB Reveals how Murtala Muhammed became the head of state and how he told Obasanjo and Danjuma that they would not be beholden to anyone as head of state, as well as the story about the day of his assassination in his Book 📚 📖
IBB, in his book, also revealed that the early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before.
He wrote: “One of the accusations against General Gowon (which, in retrospect, seemed unfair) was that he ran the business of governance ‘like a one-man show’! So, we, the ‘younger’ senior officers who had played a role in the coup, decided that the new post-Gowon government’s leadership must be overtly collective. So, while we concluded that Brigadier Murtala Muhammed should be the head of state, our preference was for him to operate only as first among equals, especially in his dealings with the two other prominent senior officers, Brigadiers Olusegun Obasanjo and Theophilus Danjuma. But we knew Muhammed enough to know he would need to be persuaded to accept such an arrangement.à
“So, while the rest of us ‘younger’ senior officers waited in an adjacent room, Colonel Wushishi, Lieutenant-Colonels Joe Garba, Abdullahi Mohammed and Yar’Adua took Brigadiers Muhammed, Obasanjo and Danjuma to another room to negotiate the terms of our proposal for a triumvirate-type leadership where Muhammed will be required to share power with Obasanjo and Danjuma. I couldn’t describe the mood since we were absent from that meeting. But we were close enough to pick up Muhammed’s thundering voice, rejecting such proposals outrightly. As far as I remember, the meeting lasted for hours past midnight. Finally, Murtala Muhammed agreed to be head of state while insisting that he would not be beholden to anyone as head of state!
In a prompt style that typified his leadership, he quickly announced several retirements the next day, just as he made new appointments. All officers above the rank of Major-General or senior to any new government member were compulsorily retired. Those retired included such persons as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Vice-Admiral Joseph Wey; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Hassan Katsina; the Chief of Staff (Army), Major-General David Ejoor; the Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh; the Chief of Air Staff, Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue; the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Salem; the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, T. A. Fagbola and Major-General Adeyinka Adebayo.
“These retirements were followed simultaneously with new appointments. While the Commissioner for Works and Housing from the old SMC, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, replaced Vice- Admiral Wey as the new Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Theophilus Danjuma replaced Major-General Ejoor as the Chief of Staff (Army). Danjuma would change the designation of that position upon resumption of office to ‘Chief of Army Staff,’ which has remained the designation ever since. The only surviving senior army officer from Gowon’s SMC, Brigadier Iliya Bisalla, also the NDA’s Commandant, became Minister of Defence. Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Yusuf became the Inspector-General of Police. Colonel John Yisa-Doko took over from Brigadier Emmanuel Ikwue as Chief of Air Staff, while Commodore Michael Adelanwa replaced Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh as Chief of Naval Staff.
“The early days of the Muhammed administration witnessed an unprecedented wave of retirements in Nigeria’s public service that had never been seen before. After the twelve military governors from the Gowon era were compulsorily retired, the government ordered a probe of their conduct in office.
“Ten of the twelve governors were found guilty of illegal enrichment and ‘dismissed with ignominy.’ Brigadiers Oluwole Rotimi and Mobolaji Johnson were the only two not found to have enriched themselves illegally.
“Some civilian members of the Gowon cabinet were also found to have enriched themselves illegally. Apart from Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the Finance Commissioner and Alhaji Ali Monguno, who was in charge of Mines and Power, the government found all others guilty of improper enrichment and were made to forfeit illegally acquired assets. Similarly, in a broad wave of retirements that affected thousands of civil servants, many top civil servants were also caught in the web of asset forfeiture of ill-gotten assets. Even the revered Federal Public Service Commission Chairman, Alhaji Sule Katagum, was not spared. He was also dismissed.
“Looking back now and writing as a member of the SMC, I realise we probably overdid the retirement exercise. The idea of retiring corrupt and incompetent public officers was appropriate. But because we failed to provide a platform for challenging retirements in the surge of events, some civil servants may have been victims of an unfair witch-hunt. Goaded on by a seemingly over-exuberant mass media, we didn’t look deeply at the implications of the mass purge, mainly as it affected the civil service. I am not sure our federal civil service fully recovered from that purge.
The General Murtala Assassination.
“FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1976, started like any typical day for me. I lived at No 19 Crescent, Ikoyi, Lagos, although my troops were stationed at the cantonment in Ikeja. However, because the Committee on Army Reorganisation, which I headed, was furiously at work during that period, I reported first in the morning at Defence Headquarters, which was close by, before heading out to Ikeja.
“My regular route to army headquarters was through the faster Osborne Road. But for some reason, on this fateful morning, as my driver opted at about 8.45 a.m. to turn right through our regular route, I instinctively told him to turn left and go through the more open Kingsway Road to avoid possible traffic congestion. That decision may have saved my life because, unknown to me, Major Ibrahim Rabo’s men, led by Lieutenant Peter Cigari, had been detailed to ambush and kill me on the Osborne Road route. At that time, I was oblivious to the fact that the so-called Dimka coup, which led to the assassination of General Murtala Muhammed, his ADC, Lieutenant Akintunde Akinsehinwa and his driver, Sergeant Adamu Michika, had been operational for over an hour. Muhammed’s orderly, who was also in the car, Staff Sergeant Michael Otuwe, narrowly survived the onslaught.
“The plotters’ strategy was to lay several ambushes for different government members along their routes to work that morning. As emerged from subsequent investigations, Major Ibrahim Rabo, Captain Malaki Parwang and Lieutenant William Seri, led by Lt-Col. Bukar Suka Dimka, laid in wait for Muhammed’s entourage. In a well-coordinated plan, Dimka assigned each assassin specific roles and functions. In aiming his shots at Muhammed, Lieutenant Seri was said to be so ruthless that he emptied more than one magazine of ammunition into the car carrying the head of state.
“The scene was in disarray when I arrived at the army headquarters, still oblivious to what had happened. But I soon found out that a coup attempt was ongoing and that it needed to be put down. I’ll never forget my exchange with General Akinrinade as I sauntered into the top floor of the building: ‘Ibrahim, where the hell have you been?’ the General inquired. ‘We’ve been looking for you. You must go and see T. Y. (Danjuma) immediately,’ he continued.
“Convinced I was being sought after because of our ongoing meeting on the army’s reorganisation, I looked at my wristwatch and told the General I was on time since it wasn’t yet 9 a.m.! ‘Who’s talking of a meeting?’ the General thundered back. ‘Haven’t you heard what happened, that the head of state has just been assassinated and that Major Dimka has made a broadcast claiming to have taken over?’
“I remember exactly how I felt that morning when General Akinrinade broke the news to me. I was utterly shattered and devastated. And I remember muttering to myself as I walked towards General Danjuma’s office: ‘Dimka, organising a coup? That’s not a serious character. How could he contemplate such a thing? Dimka? That’s impossible.’
“When I met with Danjuma, his instructions were unambiguous: ‘Ibrahim, go to the Radio House and flush Dimka out of that place immediately.’ The first thing I did was to get in touch with my troops stationed at the Ikeja cantonment. But I also knew I had to be careful with so much uncertainty in the air since I wasn’t sure where they stood regarding their loyalty. After I failed to establish contact with any of my most trusted lieutenants by telephone, I quickly hopped on a motorcycle ridden by a young corporal, whose name I forget now. On our way to Ikeja, I stopped at Lt-Col. Hamzat Abdullahi’s residence at Ilupeju, close to the Ikeja cantonment. Once I confirmed that it was safe to enter the cantonment, I borrowed Hamzat’s car and entered the premises through a rear entrance. Once inside the cantonment, I established contact with Lt-Col. Chris Ugokwe. With the assistance of Lt-Cols. Ugokwe and Joshua Dogonyaro, I mobilised loyal troops, weapons and vehicles before heading back to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) Radio House at Ikoyi.
“When we got to Radio House in an armoured column, we noticed that Dimka’s men surrounded the place, primarily young officers who were a part of the plot, including his ADC, 2nd Lt Samuel Garba. As I got down from my armoured vehicle, unarmed, and approached the building, Dimka’s ADC, Garba, attempted to stop me. By now, Dimka had spotted me from the storey building and screamed: ‘Ibrahim, I’m going to shoot you’! I shouted back: ‘Well, that’s okay. If you shoot me, you know my family. You’ll take care of them. They’ll become your responsibility. I have no problem. It would be nice to die in the hands of a friend.’ After a pause, Dimka soberly replied: ‘Ibrahim, I like your guts. Come upstairs.’
“As I gingerly took my steps up the stairs, a visibly fretful Ugokwe pleaded with me to be very careful. I waved Chris away, reminding him that ‘Bukar’ (his middle name, by which close friends called Dimka) and I had come a long way. Besides, being a trained officer, I was confident that Dimka would not shoot an unarmed colleague.
“And Dimka was indeed a close friend, one of the groomsmen at my wedding to Maryam in Kaduna in 1969. A 1963 Australian Army Officer Cadet School graduate in Portsea, Australia, Dimka was one of the first Nigerian army officers to be trained in faraway Australia. Although he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Physical Training Corps of the Army, he lived on the edge and earned himself a crappy reputation for womanising and heavy drinking.
When I got upstairs, I could tell from his breath that he had had a lot to drink.
“The stench of alcohol from around him and his boys was pungent. Chris Ugokwe was right, after all! I needed to be careful because the atmosphere was so charged that any wrong move could lead to the loss of lives. To keep Dimka at ease, I opened the conversation. ‘Bukar, why didn’t you tell me you were planning this? Com’on, you and I are supposed to be close.’
‘No, we couldn’t trust you. We didn’t know where you belonged. But I hope you know that you are one of the most unpopular officers in the Nigerian army today.’ he blurted out, his glaring bloodshot eyes betraying evidence of tiredness and confusion.
“He continued this time with a self-applauding, misplaced cockiness: ‘Ibrahim, you’re lucky to be alive because you were one of those pencilled down to be killed, but I was against it. And if I wanted to do it, I would have done it when you walked in now!’‘Why me?’ I asked him.
‘Because people felt that officers like Danjuma favoured you and liked you more than other officers,’ he replied. How could YOU be a member of the Supreme Military Council? he queried.
“Then, suddenly, his ADC, 2nd Lt Garba, also visibly drunk, nervously showed up and suggested that Dimka take me hostage and use me as a bargaining chip with the government. Dimka angrily screamed at Garba and chased him out. Once Garba scampered out, Dimka and I settled for a ‘frank’ discussion. In doing so, I reminded him of the need to keep things under control to avoid flaring tempers in the circumstances we had all found ourselves in.
First, he wanted to know if I had come to trick him into some form of surrender, akin to what happened to Chukwuma Nzeogwu during the January 1966 coup when Lt-Col. Conrad Nwawo came to Kaduna to persuade Nzeogwu to give himself up in return for some form of amnesty. When I convinced him that that was not my mission, he calmed down and listened. I asked him what he wanted, and he said he wanted a change of government. He even attempted to persuade me to join them in their attempt!
“But even as he made that intolerable request of me, it was apparent from his body language that he knew the game was up. Then, his tone started to change. Could I guarantee his safety? Could I negotiate a written amnesty for him and all his co-plotters? Again, as I had done earlier, I pleaded with him to give himself up and avoid any form of conflagration that could damage the Radio House and lead to the death of civilians and soldiers. That chit-chat went on for quite some time, and when I appeared not to be making headway with him, I left with a promise to return later.
“Only after I left Dimka did I get a better glimpse of what had happened in the past few hours. Apart from General Muhammed, who had earlier been murdered, a group of mutineers, in a case of mistaken identity, opened fire on the car carrying Colonel Reis Dumuje on Awolowo Road, believing that Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo was in the vehicle. Fortunately, Dumuje survived. In Kwara State, the Military Governor, Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, was abducted outside Offa by Lieutenant Zagni and some NCOs and murdered.
“In Ibadan, another group of mutineers led by Major Gagara went on a rampage and invaded the 26th Infantry Battalion and the WNBS/WNTV Broadcast House in Agodi. However, they could not capture the Military Governor of Oyo State, Colonel David Jemibewon, who was also to have been killed. And, as subsequent investigations showed, the mutineers laid other ambushes for General Danjuma and other senior members of the administration. I was pained to discover that not only were my close friends, such as Colonel Wya, Lt-Col. Tense, Major Ola Ogunmekan, Major Joe Kasai, and Major Alfa Aliyu, knee-deep in the plot, one of them that was closest to me, Major Clement Dabang, would be the one to suggest that I be killed.
“Meanwhile, I returned to General Danjuma to give him a report of my encounter with Dimka. Danjuma was furious. He ordered me back to the Radio House with a reiteration of his earlier instructions to ‘flush Dimka out of place immediately.’ I returned to Radio House with Chris Ugokwe, better equipped and prepared. By now, we had been joined by, among others, Mike Otuwa, James Ojokojo, John Shagaya and Jack Iketubosin. But first, I had to reach out to my friend and classmate, Sani Sami, who commanded the Brigade of Guards, to handle a difficult assignment. The Brigade of Guards’ barracks provided easy access to the Radio House. But again, I had to be careful since I wasn’t sure whether the Brigade was still loyal to the government.
“Sani Sami and I consulted and agreed that there should be minimum destruction. And that we would do what we were taught as cadets in situations involving a civilian population to ensure that civilians got out of the way and didn’t get injured. Once that was done, we moved in, cordoned off the area and engaged the mutineers in a gun battle. There were casualties in the ensuing armed confrontation, including Dimka’s ADC, 2nd Lt Garba. Also, one of the other vital plotters, Major Ibrahim Rabo, was arrested by Major Yomi Williams as he tried to escape and was promptly taken to the Bonny camp for interrogation. But, somehow, Dimka, quite inexplicably to this day, managed to escape from the scene unharmed.
“Later that evening, the Federal government announced that the coup attempt had been quashed and declared seven days of national mourning in Murtala’s honour. The next day, February 14, General Muhammed was buried in Kano at a ceremony witnessed by thousands of mourners and members of the SMC, including Major- General Bisalla, who would later be implicated in the coup attempt.”
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