Inside Israel’s Growing Spy Problem: Iran’s Silent War for Recruits

In a troubling trend that has Israeli security agencies on high alert, authorities report that 20 Iran-linked espionage cases have emerged over the past year, resulting in 30 indictments. While the stories differ in detail, they follow a remarkably consistent pattern: financially vulnerable, socially isolated Israeli citizens are being recruited through social media platforms by Iranian intelligence operatives posing as anonymous benefactors.

The latest case involves two 24-year-old childhood friends, Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias, from the town of Nasher near Haifa. Struggling with gambling debts, the duo was lured by promises of easy cash to perform seemingly harmless tasks — photographing areas near their homes, documenting local landmarks, and even burning a note opposing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As their missions escalated, they realised the requests came from Iranian intelligence. The climax of their involvement came when they attempted to install CCTV cameras near Defense Minister Yisrael Katz’s home in Kfar Ahim — a surveillance operation Israeli officials say was part of a larger assassination plot.

Their arrest marks the 20th known case of Iranian espionage activity within Israel in the past year — a staggering rise that reflects an estimated 400% increase in espionage efforts, according to Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency. Experts attribute this surge to regional instability, particularly the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, which Tehran appears to be exploiting to expand its reach.

A Pattern of Vulnerability

While each case carries unique elements, the recruitment blueprint is strikingly uniform. Iranian intelligence targets individuals on the economic margins: new immigrants, ex-convicts, or those buried under debt. Social media platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram, LinkedIn, and X serve as the initial point of contact. Recruiters often disguise themselves as employers or clients offering freelance gigs. Tasks begin small — taking photos, translating signs, collecting open-source information — but can gradually escalate to acts of sabotage or attempted assassinations.

“The people being targeted are often isolated from society, either emotionally or economically,” explains Yossi Mellman, veteran Israeli journalist and espionage expert. “What’s alarming isn’t just the number of people being recruited, but how shallow their resistance is to offers of money.”

Mellman ties this vulnerability to broader societal decay: “There’s a collapse of solidarity. If the public sees government officials working with Qatar, some wonder, ‘Why not work for Iran?’”

Amateur Agents, Real Threats

Despite the amateur status of many recruits, their actions have real consequences. In another case, an 18-year-old from Yabneh received $1,800 to photograph and provide information on a hospital where former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was being treated. A separate incident involved 73-year-old Moti Maman, who traveled to Iran and offered to assassinate Israeli leaders, asking for $1 million upfront. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

In August 2024, an Iranian-backed “Haifa Cell” of seven individuals allegedly surveilled dozens of Israeli military sites, including Iron Dome installations and the Navatim Air Base — which was later targeted in a missile strike by Iran.

Even more troubling is the case of a couple recruited through a citizen from Azerbaijan, reportedly earning $600 a day for monitoring Mossad headquarters and other high-value locations. According to the indictment, the espionage network focused exclusively on immigrants from the Caucasus region, leveraging ethnic ties to exploit personal vulnerabilities.

Tehran’s Tactics: Low-Cost, High-Access

Iranian intelligence agencies have developed an effective and inexpensive model for infiltrating Israeli society. Without needing high-tech operations or deep cover agents, they exploit the anonymity of the internet to reach susceptible individuals. Phishing scams, survey forms, and even job postings are used to gain sensitive information under the guise of routine tasks. Many of the initial contacts come through fake private detective ads or freelance work requests, which evolve into intelligence-gathering directives.

Critics argue that Israel’s current legal response is too lenient. With many convicted spies receiving only a few years in prison, there’s concern that the punishment fails to deter financially desperate individuals. And despite numerous arrests, Iran continues its digital recruitment drive largely undeterred, facing no direct consequences for orchestrating these campaigns.

A Growing National Security Dilemma

Security officials remain vigilant, and Shin Bet has successfully disrupted numerous operations before they could cause serious damage. However, they admit that not all espionage activity has been uncovered. “The most worrying thing is what we don’t know,” Mellman warns.

So far, there have been no successful assassinations of high-ranking Israeli officials, and the sensitive data obtained appears limited. Yet the persistence of Iranian intelligence — and the growing willingness of some Israelis to work with them — poses a significant threat to national security.

As the number of attempted recruitments rises, Israeli authorities are working to increase public awareness and close the digital doors through which Tehran’s agents operate. But the battle is as much about psychology and social cohesion as it is about intelligence gathering. In a society where economic strain and social division run deep, loyalty can become a luxury — and that is exactly what Iran is counting on.